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Knowledge in Context appeared in 2007 and in the years since its writing and publication, much has 
changed in psychology, in the world and in my own thinking. I am thus pleased that I can return to 
the book and this new introduction gives me the chance to reflect anew on the framework and 
analysis I originally proposed. An engagement with cultural and developmental psychology and 
empirical research on human development under contextual adversity, has given me some new 
lenses to look at the issues discussed in the book. Even though this did not change my outlook 
entirely, my understanding of sociality and social representation as evolved foundations of human 
psychology has expanded considerably. At the same time, the context and landscape of 
psychological science has changed. Work on the socio-cultural psychology of representations has 
developed and a more fine-grained picture of the dynamic, ever changing and communicative nature 
of representations is available. This work is multiple and heterogeneous and combined it elucidates 
issues of ethics and dialogicality, social change, identity, cognitive polyphasia and representations 
and action, all of which contribute to our understanding of knowledge in context (for an overview, 
see Sammut, Andreouli, Gaskell and Valsiner, 2015). Yet during the same period, psychology, a rich 
discipline ranging from the biological to the social sciences, has become less heterogeneous and 
more dependent on the vagaries of methodological determinism and the empiricism that goes with 
it.  There is less space for theory and a stronger emphasis on the production of short, self-contained 
pieces of empirical research that address a limited, at times narrow, domain. While appreciation of 
culture and context has grown, the replication crisis has shown how frail and limited is psychology’s 
understanding of its own historicity and contextual determination. Outside socio-cultural strands of 
the discipline, there continues to be little recognition of the scope and depth of changes required if 
psychological science is to engage effectively with historical time, cultural context and the majority 
world (Kagıtçıbaşı, 1996). Its evidence base is limited, centred as it is on WEIRD populations mainly 
(western, educated, industrial, rich, developed; see Henrich, Heine, and Norenzayan, 2010). 
 
Part of the problem continues to be the treatment of context as an abstract domain, approached 
either as a general process or as an unqualified independent variable, carrying little if any theoretical 
power.  Context is poorly if ever defined and the unspoken assumptions that guide the manner in 
which psychologists study it rarely unpacked (see Israel and Tajfel, 1972; Cole, 1991; Farr, 1996 and 
Bar-Tal, 2000 for early statements of the problem and Greenfield, 2017 for a more recent 
assessment). Treating contexts in abstract precludes the analytical steps that enable a theory of 
context and a more robust understanding of the historical, cultural and political specificity of the 
various niches in which mind and behaviour evolve. Notwithstanding the theory and evidence 
amassed by socio-cultural psychologists over the decades, much psychological research treats US-EU 
contexts and peoples as universals seeing other places and people as ‘particular’ cultural others. 
Lack of contextual elaboration precludes a full appreciation of how much this type of psychology is 
itself dependent on implicit cultural assumptions and the ethical problems entangled in electing, be 
it unintendedly or out of theoretical naivety,  one particular socio-cultural niche as the benchmark 
against which everything else becomes ‘other’ (chapter 2, see also Keller, 2017 for a recent view). 
This debate matters today as it has mattered throughout the history of psychology, because human 
development does not produce one single pathway that encompasses all of human cognitive and 
societal capacities; societies, cultures and cognitive processes are adaptive and thus vary historically 
and geographically. Importantly, there is logic, rationality and wisdom in all local systems of thinking 
and feeling, and no solid scientific and indeed moral foundation for identifying in the cultural other, 




Knowledge in Context sought to settle accounts with this trend in psychological science. My 
research, as well as my life, in Brazil and the UK reiterated to me over the years that knowledge 
develops not only as a cognitive construct but also as an emotional, social and cultural process. I set 
out to demonstrate this claim through the analysis of representation and its relation to culture and 
public spheres. I proposed to study representation through its extended ‘architecture’: a triangle of 
communicative mediations between self-other-object, in time and space, which drew on Moscovici’s 
model of the semiotic triangle Ego-Alter-Object (Moscovici, 1984). My intention was to move the 
psychology of representation from the lonely mind to a space of relations between minds and 
between minds and social artefacts. Since then my thinking has been enriched by insights and 
research on extended cognition and the developmental approach. 
 
Representation as Extended Cognition 
A central argument of the book was that the extended architecture of representation underlies all 
forms of human knowledge and explains its variation in different public spheres (chapter 1). To 
develop the argument and establish a socio-cultural psychology of knowledge, I revisited debates 
and exchanges that took place at a time when disciplinary boundaries mattered much less than 
today. I engaged with pioneers such as Piaget, Vygotsky, Durkheim and Levy-Bhrul, and took the 
psychology of representations proposed by Moscovici with a very open vista towards other areas of 
psychology and the social sciences as a whole (chapters 2 and 3).  As I discuss in the book, all of 
these pioneers, albeit in different ways, reaffirm the triadic model of mind and the primacy of 
intersubjectivity in the study of knowledge.  From this perspective, the production, consolidation 
and transformation of knowledge is not the product of the individual mind alone, but extends into 
self-other interactions and objects, which exist in a socio-cultural niche that is itself constructed. 
Humans develop mind through participation in the socio-cultural environment (Vygotsky, 1978). 
Vygotsky’s genetic law of cultural development not only inscribed social interaction in the core of 
human psychology, it also formulated its primacy: “any function in the child’s cultural development 
appears twice, or on two planes. First, it appears on the social plane, and then in the psychological 
plane. First it appears between people as an interpersonal category, and then within the child as an 
intrapsychological category” (Vygotsky, 1997).  In this sense, my original proposition that 
representation is an emergent property of minds in context continues to hold. I see it today as part 
of a wider research stream that includes various forms of cultural and cross-cultural psychology, 
situated cognition and communities of practice. Evidence and thinking supporting the view that 
psychological phenomena are not simply inside the head but are ‘extended’ into bodies, artefacts, 
relationships and institutions has increased and diversified.  
 
New research and thinking about the co-evolution of knowledge and the socio-cultural environment 
shows that for humans, knowing the world is both being in the world and making the world: our 
ability to build dialogic representations, and with it, understand others and ourselves is extended in 
our bodies and builds our communities and public contexts (Perret-Clermont, 2015; Trevarthen, 
2012, 2015; Tomasello, 2016). This is in tandem with our evolutionary history. We are cooperative 
breeders and rely on alloparenting, involving many others in the care of our babies and young 
children (Hrdy, 2009). Our unique cognitive skills first emerged to solve problems of social 
coordination (Humphrey, 1976; Tomasello, Melis, Tennie, Wyman, and Herrmann, 2012), we point 
from a very young age, inviting others to share attention with us and experience the object or 
situation we are interested in (Bruner, 1983).  Of all great apes, we are the only ones who evolved 
language and culture transforming signs into complex symbolic structures that live on in stories 
(imagined and real), rules, institutions and artefacts. Intersection between multiple communicative 
dyads form processes in which community-level cognitive structures emerge and consolidate in 
institutions and over historical time, enabling us to establish the ‘transcendental social’ (Bloch, 2008) 
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that feeds-back and itself becomes a driver of the psychosocial processes that produced it in the first 
place.   
 
Developmental Lines: Ontogenesis, Sociogenesis and Phylogenesis 
Nowhere is the relationship between mind and context more evident than in the development of 
the child and in Knowledge in Context (chapters 1 and 2) I turned to traditions preoccupied with the 
inter-relations between the ontogenesis and the sociogenesis, exploring a psychological field that 
connects the development of children to the socio-cultural evolution of adult society. Human infancy 
carries us to adulthood through emotional, social and cultural worlds that are much more than a 
simple preparation stage for the society of grown-ups (Furth, 1996; Keller, 2007; Piaget, 1995); 
rather, human development shows from the beginning that our human nature makes us 
interdependent on collective forms of acting and thinking (Duveen, 2013). In this sense, observing 
the development of knowledge in the socialization of human infants casts light not only on the social 
and emotional foundations of cognition but also reveals much about how our psychology and 
evolutionary history shape society and the dynamic of public spheres. 
 
New forms of theorising about evolution (Boyd, Richerson and Henrich, 2011; Franks, 2013, 2011; 
Gilbert, Bosch and Ledón-Rettig, 2015;  Hrdy, 2009; Humphrey, 2012; Semin and Echterhoff, 2010; 
Tomasello, 2014) coupled with new technologies of research not available to early pioneers have 
added to the developmental, or historical, approach and complicated my thinking in the best 
possible ways. Today, more than in the 2000s, I can appreciate the importance of the third line of 
development considered by Vygotsky and Luria: human psychology relies on ontogenetic, 
sociogenetic and phylogenetic lines. Linking the ontogenetic, the evolutionary and socio-cultural 
lines has been the hallmark of socio-cultural psychology and research in both psychology and related 
behavioural disciplines have confirmed the necessity and vitality of the triadic conversation between 
micro-psychological, macro-societal and evolutionary processes. The futility of dichotomising nature 
and nurture and the emphasis on development as an approach to understanding the intertwining 
history of our bodies, minds and societies in fact integrates the three lines of development Vygotsky 
and Luria (1993) proposed in their early work. Humans’ long ontogeny evinces the social foundations 
of our biological development and opens the species to pedagogy and cultural transmission, which in 
turn make us social and historical beings.  
 
In what follows I draw on these central theoretical assumptions to offer a brief reappraisal of the 
themes I explored in Knowledge in Context. I will recast the extended architecture of representation 
as the basis of our common ground and discuss how change in public spheres relate to 
transformations in the dynamic of social representations. I will expand my original argument with 
new research and thinking on these issues focusing primarily on social change, identity and cognitive 
polyphasia. In the final section of this introduction, I will use this reappraisal to consider the new 
psychology of the networked public sphere, charting developments that were not at all present 
when I wrote the book.  I will examine the potentials and challenges introduced by the new digital 
technologies of the participatory web and address the manner in which virtual publics challenge 
communities of attention, re-draw boundaries between the public and private spheres and pose 
dangers to the communicative and ethical impetus that forms knowledge, the common ground and, 
at the extreme, the very core of ourselves.   
 
 
1. Our Common Ground: Togetherness in mind and community  
 
A major theme of Knowledge in Context was the relationship between knowledge and togetherness, 
which I explored through the conceptual link between representation, community and culture. The 
focus on community of minds and the communicative action between minds sought to study societal 
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and cultural thinking, a we-type form of extended cognition that goes beyond individual thinking 
inside the head to conceive a co-constructed system of shared meanings and practices. Importantly, 
this system comes into being through modalities of interaction and communication that evolve in 
time (Bauer and Gaskell, 1999, 2008) and are patterned by culture (chapter 3, 4 and 6). Thinking 
together is for humans a major driver of togetherness itself, a dynamic cycle of mutual constitution 
in which sociality forms cognition and builds a system of shared meaning that in turn builds the 
social representations that connect participants and establish specific cultural communities. Thinking 
together depends on togetherness and the ways in which it is enacted, so that “all higher mental 
functions are internalized social relationships” (Vygotsky, 1978, p. 74). Human psychology is thus 
intertwined with the exchanges experienced in public worlds. These exchanges constitute the basic 
architecture of human cognition and without them there would be no progress in human 
understanding, learning and cultural transmission.  
 
Understandings of how ‘we’ forms of cognition enable our common ground continue to evolve. New 
work on shared intentionality and the epistemological and ethical triangle of knowledge contribute 
to recasting the importance of common ground and the troubles that follow when it is undermined. 
The notion of shared intentionality, as proposed by Tomasello’s research programme on 
comparative development and Ivana Marková’s work on the dialogical mind are exciting 
developments in this direction.  
 
Shared Intentionality 
Shared intentionality is a unique feature of human cognition, differentiating humans from their 
closest relatives pan paniscus (Tomasello, 2014). The phenomenon should be of great interest for 
socio-cultural psychologists studying knowledge in context because it is the result of a system of 
collaborative action that is at once outcome and driver of social and cultural formation. In this 
system, which is triangular and compatible with the semiotic triangle of mediations, interlocutors 
form a dual attention structure with a shared focus on 1) coordinating understanding of their own 
individual role and of the role of their interlocutors, and 2) building a coordinated representation of 
the task or the joint goal. Acting together, to put up a tent for example, participants understand 
reciprocity and reversibility of individual roles so that “I can do one part of the task and you can do 
another and we can swap roles if needed because we both understand each part of the process from 
learning from each other. Through our relations, we share the goal of setting up the tent”. Shared 
intentionality is thus an emergent property of inter-relations between minds, in line with Mead’s 
original insights on perspective-taking and the socio-cultural traditions of Piaget and Vygotsky. Its 
systematic analysis specifies the microgenesis of our minds and our common ground as two sides of 
the same process. Research on shared intentionality adds to all previous triadic models that 
elaborated on collaborative interaction between minds as motivational driver and causal agent of 
cognitive outcomes. New, however, is the ability to demonstrate these theoretical insights by 
combining the ontogenetic, sociogenetic and phylogenetic lines through comparative research on 
children, culture and non-human primates.  
 
Epistemological and Ethical Triangle 
A second important development is the expansion of Marková’s dialogical approach to mind and 
social representation through the analysis of the epistemological and ethical triangle of knowledge 
(Marková, 2016). This work foregrounds the interdependence between Self and Alter as the basis of 
all knowledge and as the basis of our ethical life. Mind of Self and Other are inderdependent in and 
trough sense-making and creation of a common cultural ground. Marková (2016) takes this 
interdependence as the basic tenet to build an argument that is both historical and psychological. 
For example, the historical development of perspective as a form of symbolic representation 
culminated in the Renaissance and revolutionised the understanding of the world, from 
unidimensional and finite to multi-dimensional and infinite. The perception that reality is seen 
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through multiple perspectives opened up an extraordinary unbounded horizon for human 
understanding when it first emerged; a historical transformation of the human mind that displaces 
the idea of a single view by multiplicity of points of view, changes the nature of knowledge 
production as well as beliefs about the human condition. Evolution may have predisposed us to 
recognise faces and engage with others but several centuries of historical change were required to 
build the perspectival representations that make the dialogical mind. Perspectival representation, a 
coordinated process that occurs in mind, art, knowledge, philosophy and political transformations is 
historical as well as psychological.  
 
Marková’s research illuminates the sociality of mind by zooming on dialogue and the various ways in 
which the triadic relations between Self-Alter-Object are realised, enabling and, at times disabling, 
our common ground (Marková, 2017a, 2017b). The analysis of what makes and breaks the 
epistemological triangle has spearheaded new conceptual and empirical research on the extended 
architecture of representations and their communicative basis. This work contributes a detailed, 
fine-grained analysis of Self-Alter-Object dynamic demonstrating the microgenetic processes that 
pertain the encounter between different knowledge and worldviews as they meet and clash in 
public spheres. These include understanding more how individuals elaborate representations in the 
context of relations with institutions and their own communities (Mouro and Castro, 2016), outlining 
different modalities of communication such as consensualisation and reification (Batel and Castro, 
2009) and identifying enablers and barriers to communication such as semantic barriers and 
semantic facilitators (Gillespie, 2008). Studies on the dynamic of identity and acculturation 
(Andreouli, 2013; Howarth, Wagner, Magnusson and Sammut, 2013) and the role of imagination and 
experience in human development (Jovchelovitch, Priego-Hernandez and Glaveanu, 2017; Zitton, 
2016; Zittoun and Gillespie, 2016) have shown the implication of identity, imagination and culture in 
the development of knowledge of self, other and community. Combined, this work adds 
conceptually and empirically to our understanding of how systems of shared meaning and practice 
operate in building or undermining the common ground. It shows that rather than direct copy or 
imitative pedagogical transmission from one group to another or to one generation to another, 
cultural beliefs, representations and practices are generated, transmitted and transformed by a) 
linguistic, argumentative and negotiated modes of Self-Other interaction and b) psychologics 
motivated by identity, imaginations, historical meanings.   
 
Disruptions in Knowledge and Common Ground 
A second and central insight of Marková’s approach refers to the ethical foundations of our ways of 
knowing and the dangers involved in the disruption of the epistemological triangle. Marková argues 
that the meeting between Self-Alter-Object comprises an irreducible ontological, ethical and 
epistemological unit. The Other, as the Self, is not an ‘it’ that does not matter. The Other supports 
and enables the Self, makes a ‘call’ on Self and demands an ethical stance where Self takes 
responsibility for how it understands and makes sense of the Other, for how it positions its 
knowledge and action towards the Other, for how it reflects on itself within the parameters of a 
moral framework. This ethical and ontological unit of Self and Alter extend into the epistemological 
triangle of Self-Other-Alter (Marková, 2016). Developmentally, it is not accidental that human 
children learn about a moral framework at the same time that they begin to take the perspective of 
the other, understand themselves as selves, and importantly, understand that they share common 
cultural ground with other members of their community (Liebal, Carpenter and Tomasello, 2013). 
The ethical, the ontological and the epistemological partake a developmental history, being as they 
are embedded in the psychology of Self and Other relations. Interactional epistemologies, which are 
formed through communicative action, are at the same time ontological and ethical units containing 




This analysis enables not only an understanding of what makes the common ground but also and 
importantly, an appreciation of its pathologies and distortions. Marková develops a devastating 
assessment of how the contemporary domination of markets, bureaucracy and technology 
undermines the very core of our human psychology and breaks the dialogical triangle. Historical 
examples such as Nazism and Stalinism (Marková, 2017a), are analysed in conjunction with current 
phenomena such as bureaucratization and consumerism (Marková, 2017b), in which relations 
between Self-Alter-Object are replaced by purely instrumental and technocratic relations between 
Self-Alter-Thing. This work makes clear how these forces break the unit between ethics and 
epistemology and the connection between cognition, emotion and human goals, challenging the 
dialogical mind. These ruptures are particularly relevant to consider in today’s public sphere, and in 
the next pages I will draw on this model to assess how new modalities of communication and 
interaction unsettle the common ground, our ability for social thinking and the very centre of our 
individual lives: the self.   
 
 
2. The Psychology of Community and Public Spheres  
 
Another major theme of Knowledge in Context was to establish the psychological dimensions of 
communities and public spheres (chapter 3) as the common ground of our shared human life. I 
theorised community through the notions of boundary, belonging and lifeworld, created and 
sustained by social memory and story-telling. I argued that key to community life is the creation of a 
public sphere, an arena that is visible, open and common to all.  I drew on Arendt, Mead and 
Habermas to propose a social psychology of public spheres as a space in which Self and Other meet, 
interact and construct representations of themselves, others and issues that matter for their 
communities. In public arenas, individual actors encounter the otherness of a plural, many-voiced 
and multifaceted world that presents to them the ineradicable fact that being many and not one 
inheres our human condition (Arendt, 1958).   
 
At the centre of my argument was the idea that all human communities, in developing specific socio-
cultural patterns of living together, build public spheres. Notwithstanding how much I admire and 
am indebted to Habermas in framing my way of thinking social psychology, I was dissatisfied with his 
concept of public sphere as unique to the liberal model that emerged in Europe in a defined 
historical period. I suggested instead that rather than limiting a theory of public life to the European 
case, we need an expanded theory that encompasses a wider range of human experiences.  Public 
spheres pertain to the universal human rather than to a particular sub-set of humans. They are the 
spaces in which a community’s common ground is build (or destroyed), where communities of 
attention focus on issues that matter to them and where social actors come to build shared 
knowledge, i.e, the set of representations, ideas, values and know-hows that configure their culture 
and common sense. These processes occur in places as diverse as the UK, Afghanistan and the 
Tikuna tribal community in Brazil; they include social rituals as diverse as carnivals and religious 
processions and parliaments and social media. In this sense, public spheres are a human universal 
that presents in all cultures albeit in different forms.  
 
Knowledge in Context’s point of departure to explore different forms of public life was to compare 
social and collective representations in traditional and de-traditionalised communities. I drew on 
Durkheim and Moscovici’s conceptions of how socio-cognitive formations correspond to different 
types of public sphere. Durkheim’s notion of collective representations, described as the ‘soul’ of the 
community and the basis of social solidarity, captures the common ground as homogenous and all-
encompassing and are the mode of thinking of traditional public spheres; Moscovici’s notion of 
social representations introduces diversity and contestation and are the mode of thinking of de-




Societal Change: Diversity in the Public Sphere 
My understanding of these issues in the early 2000s was very much influenced by the sociology of 
late modernity and I worked with Moscovici’s formulation, arguing in the book that we needed to 
move away from a conception of excessive homogeneity. A new diversity in worldviews and 
practices unsettles homogeneity and disrupts the symbolic content of representational systems: 
collective representations do not go away, but they co-exist with social representations, which are as 
much about shared and consensual symbolic codes as they are about contradictory and unresolved 
ones (chapters 3, 4 and 5). A theory that conceived of any one particular public sphere as containing 
one set of collective or social representations was no longer plausible, given the new regime of 
societal exchanges and global coordination so well described by the sociologists of late modernity.  
With the structure of public spheres changing economically and politically, we are bound to observe 
changes in their social psychology.  
 
Since then, Castro (2012) has taken up Moscovici’s typology of representations as polemical, 
hegemonic and emancipated (Moscovici, 1988) to propose a cycle of societal change based on the 
emergence, institutionalisation, generalisation and stabilisation of different types of social 
representation. This model considers social representations in plural societies in terms of their 
sociogenesis, or developmental history: representations evolve and acquire different forms 
depending on levels of group cohesion and plurality of views in the public sphere. Its contribution is 
to show that multiple forms of representation co-exist in public spheres, interacting and changing as 
a function of social, political and psychological processes. Polemic representations, as the name 
indicates, are highly controversial and normally held by one or more sub-publics. They are 
consensual within the in-group but not widely shared and generate antagonistic relations between 
groups in the wider public sphere. Representations of Brexit in the UK exemplify well this kind of 
polemic representation that divided families and friends to the point that people avoid expressing 
them outside the in-group.  
 
Hegemonic representations stand on the other side of the spectrum as widely shared and 
disseminated systems of thinking that achieve the status of taken-for-granted beliefs. Examples of 
hegemonic representations are taboos, such as representations of female genital surgeries in the 
West (Shweder, 2003). Hegemonic and polemic representations are both highly consensual, the 
difference being how widespread they are in a public sphere; hegemonic representations are 
everywhere, inscribed in institutions and routines as well as social thinking, polemic representations 
belong to specific sub-publics and lack firm objectification in social institutions and widespread 
practices. It is interesting to observe that highly hegemonic representations can easily become 
polemic through the intervention of active minorities and social movements. Stabilising 
representations into a hegemonic form can take years, even centuries, and can be only fully 
understood through a historical approach (Hilton and Liu, 2017; Laszlo, 2008) which unpacks the 
long durée of societal thinking.  
 
Emancipated representations are those that ‘free’ themselves from their communities of origin and 
circulate in the public sphere detached from the sub-publics that produced them. These 
representations circulate beyond in-groups and are typical of plural and open public spheres where 
mass media of communication leverage the distribution of knowledge and make it diffuse across a 
population of minds. Emancipated representations are enabled by diffusion and by a relatively open 
political atmosphere where communication enables inter-group exchanges in ways that tend to 
transform the thinking of in-groups. Emancipated representations operate as thinking resources for 
open public spheres, in which sub-publics are flexible and pragmatic in drawing from the pool of 
knowledges circulating at any given time.  Castro’s model links up macro-processes of emergence, 
institutionalisation, generalisation and stabilisation of representations to micro-processes of 
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communication, where the analysis of argumentation and discursive formats in everyday 
communication is the key entry point to understand how social actors make sense of novel social 
objects. 
 
Castro’s model of social change is enriched by Gillespie’s theory of alternative representations, 
which offers further analytical categories to capture how micro-genetic processes of semantic 
exchange occurring in ordinary language push or block the cycle of representational change. 
Drawing on Moscovici’s original work on psychoanalysis, Gillespie (2008) elaborates social actors’ 
responses to representations they know about but do not believe in or do not identify with through 
the idea of alternative representations as ‘the representation of a potentially competing 
representation from within a social representation’. He explores the semantic barriers people deploy 
to avoid destabilising their own worldviews and sub-culture. These semantic barriers can take many 
forms, which include rigid oppositions, negative associations, prohibitions and taboos, stigma, 
psychological bracketing and undermining motives. They restrict communication between 
representations and their alternatives and keep competing representations at bay, demonstrating 
the elusive sharedness of social representations in contested, diverse societies.  
 
Cognitive Polyphasia 
In the 2000s, economic and cultural globalisation, the fast development of the internet, 
multiculturalism and a proliferation of identity concerns suggested very clearly that a new regime of 
representations was apace, one that foregrounded difference and cultural otherness. The 
explorations Self makes of Other and by the same process, of itself, were intensified by immigration 
and multiculturalism in the physical public sphere and the fast and vast connections of the virtual 
public sphere (chapter 5). A new regime of encounters between selves, groups and their social 
representations undermined homogeneity and increased diversity resulting in new forms of 
emancipated and polemic representations that combine multiple symbolic resources, coming from 
different cultures and spheres of knowledge (Howarth, Cornish and Gillespie, 2015).  
 
Encounters between different spheres and domains of knowledge became typical of our multi-
representational and global world. They frequently entail the contrast between science and common 
sense, debating the value of one over the other. Lay understandings are predominantly seen as 
inferior to science, which in time will transform and displace cultural beliefs and religious thinking. 
Knowledge in Context drew on the hypothesis of cognitive polyphasia to argue that it is futile to 
expect that religion will ‘develop’ into science and that the mythologies that guide our cultural 
identities and religious beliefs will be destroyed by the ‘education of reason’, as the dreamers of 
modernity once proposed. Human cognitive functioning is polyphasic and combines rather than 
excludes different systems of representation (Moscovici, 2008). Cognitive polyphasia captures 
precisely this co-existence of different forms of knowledge and modalities of representation, in 
which science, common sense, arts and religion lived side by side. I argued that rather than putting 
different ways of knowing – and the cultures and psychologies they contain – in a hierarchical scale, 
we should understand that humans build multiple systems of knowledge, which are combined and 
used adaptively depending on the pragmatics of the situation.  
 
In the last ten years or so corroboration of the phenomenon comes from different disciplines and 
areas of psychology through a rich and diverse stream of research. Cognitive polyphasia has been 
reported in studies involving both field and experimental evidence, in domains as diverse as health, 
identity, environmental policy, urban studies and public understanding of science, by social and 
developmental psychologists, cognitive scientists and anthropologists (for an overview of this 
research see Jovchelovitch and Priego-Hernandez, 2015). This work has been integrated and 
systematised and today we know more about how different forms of knowledge co-exist. Research 
has shown the co-existence of different dimensions, constituents and levels of contradiction 
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pertaining to different forms of knowledge, which include conflict about what an object means, how 
people think and what they feel about a domain of knowledge. We also know more about varieties 
of cognitive polyphasia such as selective prevalence, hybridisation and displacement (Priego-
Hernandez, 2017). Combined, this research shows that human cognitive functioning is flexible and 
adpative in making the most of the diversity of knowledges that is typical of the human symbolic 
landscape. This diversity is a property and an asset of human cognition, whose rationality is better 
understood in relation to the cultural niche in which it evolves, the pragmatics of the situation to 
which it responds and the public sphere in which it circulates.  
 
Identity and Representations 
The focus of much work in the last decade has been to theorise and specify how representational 
change relates to the dynamics of identity, discursive strategies and inter-group relations. In many 
respects, this has been facilitated by a reconnection, long overdue, between social representations, 
social identity and inter-group relations, rhetorical and discursive theories. A new generation of 
scholars, blissfully oblivious to the politics of small differences, is combining concepts and research 
from these fields to produce a wealth of new work that integrates insights from different streams of 
thinking in social and cultural psychology (Amer and Howarth, 2018; Andreouli and Howarth, 2013; 
Elcheroth, Doise and Reicher, 2011; Gibson et.al., 2018; Hopkins and Greenwood, 2013, Howarth 
and Andreouli, 2016a, 2016b). This research articulates with greater clarity a) the impact of 
representations in inter-group relations and thus social identities and b) the contested and 
polyphonic nature of personal and social identities in a world of ever-changing, multiple and 
contradictory representations and c) the argumentative, discursive and rhetorical processes that 
underlie representations and identities. It has also called attention to the links between identities 
and representations of the common ground, understood through the lenses of citizenship, 
cosmopolitanism and nationhood.  
 
This new work specifies the discursive and polyphasic logic of representational change and how 
contestation and multiple types of representation are elaborated and lived through polyphonic 
identities. It offers insights on the operations of language and everyday talk in the production of 
identity and representations, expanding knowledge of the psychosocial processes whereby public 
spheres open up and close down new meaning. This work adds to the macro-level theory of 
knowledge encounters that I offered (chapter 5) when examining how in-groups relate to 
representations and logics coming from different peoples, domains of knowledge and ways of life.  
The problem of knowledge encounters and the underlying dialogicality or monologicality that 
supports them has not gone away. If anything, we are witnessing today a potential recrudescence of 
in-group thinking and a tendency to dismiss and diminish the knowledge and identity of others, be 
them out-groups, cultural others or just those we disagree with within our own public spheres.  
 
 
3. From Tradition to Twitter and Back: Common ground and social representations in 
the networked public sphere 
 
Transformations in the ways of thinking and relating of communities signal a new psychology of the 
contemporary public sphere and in the final part of this new introduction, I want to consider these 
challenges, which were not at all present when I wrote the book. In this second decade of the 21st 
century connectivity and interconnectedness have become ubiquitous; yet, the promises contained 
in globalization and multiculture feel very different today. Authoritarian populism, inequality and the 
retreat of face-to-face communication have dulled the initial enthusiasm of early advocates of 
globalisation and the internet itself has moved into a dystopian territory marked by surveillance, 
algorithm control, political manipulation and monetary use of individual selves. Inequality, 
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represented as a social ill by the post-war consensus of the welfare state, gradually transformed into 
the new normal background of societies where individuals act independently of each other, 
maximise their interests and follow the logic of markets as internalised prescription for individual 
behaviour (Scharff, 2016). Echo chambers and polarization entered everyday language bringing alive 
the notion of non-dialogicality and even decline in knowledge encounters. Individual loneliness 
seems to be the only authentic subjective experience underlying the gloss of permanent connectivity 
and excessive self-exposure. In private and in public, accuracy in cognition and our representations 
of ‘we’ seem to be shrinking as ‘fake news’, Facebook, Instagram and Twitter take us away from a 
common ‘agora’ of dialogue and public debate into separate, isolated in-group bunkers. Contexts of 
knowledge have changed and today they present new challenges to the self and to processes of 
social representation. In what follows I will focus on the discontents of connectivity and in particular 
on the new format of communication enabled by ICTs (information and communication 
technologies) and social media to consider how it affects the common ground, processes of social 
representation and selfhood.   
 
The Networked Public Sphere 
As Castel (2008) authoritatively argued, the new public sphere is made of networked society and the 
rise of self-communication. It is predominantly a virtual sphere created around the media system, in 
which wide horizontal networks of peer-to-peer interaction by-pass traditional centres of expertise, 
authority and information control. These new horizontal networks greatly disrupt early forms of 
mass-mediated communication, which relied on centralised and unidirectional spheres of 
production and reception. Decentred and unbounded from traditional forms of control, they 
constitute the beginnings of a global virtual public sphere where meaning making is transformed by 
the availability of open digital content that is free for downloading and re-working. Individuals and 
organised communities hold a new kind of freedom to self-generate and distribute content, making 
this virtual public sphere self-determined in ways that the physical public sphere has never been and 
cannot be. This is because the city and the physicality of its squares, markets and other people, or 
the political space of institutions and civic face-to-face association do not allow for the self, 
individual or collective, the same level of control over the production, emission and reception of 
meaning and information. The materiality of the physical public sphere is locally grounded and face-
to-face; it limits what is available, as well as the capacity of self to fully control its responses to 
others and situations. Networked society in contrast blows open the immediate reciprocity and 
boundaries of situations, enabling reconfigurations that can be controlled by users and their chosen 
networks. It takes our human sociality to new levels of connectivity bypassing hierarchies, societal 
distinctions, cultural distance, institutional domains and the separation between private and public 
spheres. The question however is what this new connectivity is doing to our relational ties and the 
format of our public spheres.  
 
New Social Media and the Participatory Web 
The growth of the participatory Web 2.0 grew and new media moved network society beyond the 
simple distinction between traditional and de-traditionalised public spheres. The differentiation 
between traditional community and modern society exploded in face of a public space that is 
unbounded and connected, yet more fragmented, lonely and homogenous. Over the last years, 
much research has focused on the ability of new digital media to either invigorate or undermine the 
vitality of the public sphere, understood as public debate, citizen participation and interaction 
between diversity of opinions and information (Rasmussen, 2014; Bruns and Highfield, 2016; 
(Hampton, Livio and Goulet, 2010).  Understandably, this assessment has been focused on the ability 
of the new medium to actualise Habermas’ principles of the democratic public sphere. Many 
believed that the participatory Internet and social media could unleash the unrealised potential of 
the democratic public sphere enabling inequalities of status to be disregarded and everyone to 




Whether this belief was justified remains an open question, as the evidence to this day is 
inconclusive. Researchers find both an increase in public debate and argumentation and in self-
segregation and balkanisation (see Colleonni et al., 2014). A compelling interpretation of these 
contradictory findings is that new media are open for multiple forms of use, which enable 
contradictory effects. On the one hand, they leverage the power of community and empower in-
groups to act forcefully in the public sphere, contributing to the expression of historically 
marginalised voices. Connectivity, expanded sociability and self-determination of content enhance 
social collaboration and agency.  This is expressed in a new ability to speak and to be heard that 
unlocks bottom-up social development and the power of the collective mind (Brundidge, 2010; 
Bruns and Highfield, 2016; Jovchelovitch and Priego-Hernandez, 2013). Yet, whereas the potential 
for participation is there and larger than ever before, power inequalities continue to play an 
important role, pushing segregation and excessive niche construction. Yang, Quan-Haase and 
Rannenberg (2017) found that debate in the virtual public sphere is mainly controlled by elites and 
tends to reproduce the exclusions and social dynamics of the physical public sphere. Key players in 
public debate continue to be companies, experts and news portals. Depending on political cultures, 
they reinforce partisan views and polarise public debate (Barberá et al, 2015; Boutyline and Willer, 
2017), undermining dialogue and the exchanges that are required for settling differences and 
building consensus in the democratic polis (Colleoni et al., 2014;). Importantly, all of these activities 
are being tracked by third parties who are not interested in watching per se but in using the 
information as a lucrative commodity or a means to achieve political ends or both (Couldry and 
Turrow, 2014). Harper (2017) has convincingly argued that big data negatively reconfigures the 
public sphere because it erases the uniqueness of minor publics and amplifies the tyranny of the 
majority, favouring existing networks of power and enhancing homogeneity. It uses everyday 
participation, social collaboration and agency to map out human behaviour and sell it to those who 
control markets and institutional politics. 
 
From Communities of Attention to the Portable Private Virtual Public Sphere 
These contradictory potentials of new media are not different from the contradictions identified in 
earlier forms of mass mediated communication, including printed and electronic media (Habermas 
and Schewering, 2014). However, for socio-cultural psychologists the question matters because 
these technologies are tools of the dialogical mind, an extension of mind and behaviour in the public 
sphere.  Humans use tools as mediating artefacts in their interactions with the environment and 
with other humans, and in so doing they shape themselves, their societies and cultures. Social media 
and ICTs are mediational artefacts and the new forms of interaction and communication they enable 
need to be considered to the extent that they unsettle the architecture of the epistemological 
triangle and with it, the interactions that enable the dialogical mind, common ground and processes 
of social representation. There is little doubt that they change the content and the process of 
communication, the logical implication being that they change mind, community and social 
representation.  
 
From the newspaper, to radio, to television, the consumption of mass media presupposed a 
community of attention, where minds focused on the same object/topic/material.  We can visualise 
the connection between points of production and reception around families listening to the radio 
and later watching television together. These early types of mediated communication kept the 
architecture of shared intentionality intact, connecting users in a classical triangle where there is a 
community of multiple minds paying attention to a common ground. Watching television even 
reinforced common ground and community of minds, as media theorists argued in relation to the 
medium. Silverstone’s (1994) now classical argument of television as a potential space captured well 
its communicative foundations and the potentials of communities of attention to build spaces of 
shared experience. The agency of audiences in the appropriation of content (Livingstone, 1989) was 
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clear and between the production and reception of content there was a potential space of lived 
experience and sense-making that created and sustained communities of shared attention.  
 
Mobile devices and the smart phone in particular, challenge the dialogical format of early types of 
media and face-to-face communication while overabundance of information distracts rather than 
concentrate attention. Carried by individuals as private portable territories (Hatuka, 2014), the smart 
phone enables customising interaction with chosen publics and content. Submerged in this personal 
portable territory that is paradoxically a virtual public sphere, the individual self alone controls its 
communicative experience designing what and how it communicates, what wants to know, from 
whom and where. Through various digital platforms that are open to the emission of content with 
little checks and controls, it curates its own exposure and what ‘engages’ with, carefully designing 
the visibility of its inner, private life and the way it relates to others. In contrast to the triangular 
model of Self and Other sharing the medium and its content, individuals today inhabit the physical 
public sphere with their heads deep into their phones, shut down from the immediate environment, 
moving through communal spaces as if they were in private bubbles. The individualisation and 
extreme self-determination enabled by new media technologies disrupt the communication 
between Ego-Alter as well as the shared focus of attention in a common object (Figure 1). The 
excessive attention on self takes its focus away from the ‘here and now’ of face-to-face interaction 
and cuts off the physical and institutional public sphere. As Turkle (2011) argued, what people want 
most from public spaces is to be left alone to engage with their own personal networks.   
 







The effect is a combined individualisation of the private sphere and a personalisation of the public 
sphere. Constant self-exposure trivialises intimacy and takes depth away from relationships while 
throwing into the public sphere material that obfuscates and displaces topics and issues of common 
concern (Harper, 2011). This displacement of private content from self to public sphere has a 
negative double effect on both. Privacy is essential to the life of the self (Shwartz, 1968); we are self-
conscious animals with an inner life that makes the learning and regulation of the qualia of self-
experience one of our most important social and psychological tasks. This only happens if we 
develop and sustain spaces in which we can be alone with ourselves (Winnicott, 1965; Arendt, 
1958). As Humphrey (2007) noted, “we are a society of private selves and the privacy of 
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consciousness has an evolutionary history and maybe even an evolutionary function. We are 
exceptionally social but also exceptionally lonely”.  Regulating our inner qualia is crucial because it 
contains worlds of its own, which are so immense and powerful in the emotion and experiences they 
carry that full transparency and disclosure can substantially disrupt and indeed even destroy a public 
sphere. The psychology of privacy is fundamentally related to the psychology, and indeed very 
possibility, of a public sphere, thus the management of front and back-stage as necessary rituals of 
self-presentation in everyday life (Goffman, 1956). The constrains of culture teach us how to 
regulate our inner private lives to contain aggression and prevent the unconscious from roaming 
free in our social spaces  so that we “make the right (and not violence) the might of community life” 
(Freud, 1930).  
 
Arguably, cultures of visibility and invisibility offer positive and negative possibilities. Schroer (2014) 
offered a helpful systematisation suggesting that we differentiate those situations when they are 
wanted and unwanted. For example, we want to be ‘visible’, i.e, socially recognised and 
acknowledged but not monitored and tracked all the time. We may want to be ‘invisible’, in terms of 
retaining our intimacy and right to withdraw from public spaces but not disregarded and denied the 
right to have our identity ‘seen’ in the public sphere.  Today’s culture of visibility puts pressure on 
what is wanted and unwanted, changing the inner and outer life of the self. From the early days of 
reality shows, when television became a vehicle for ‘confessional’ forms of personal drama played 
out to audiences around the world to today’s social media, self-exposure has attained a new 
privileged centre. Constantly connected to a virtual public sphere that enhances its visibility and by 
the same process undermines its privacy (Hatuka and Tosch, 2016), the self generates large amounts 
of content that become information and meaning ready to be exploited commercially, politically and 
psychologically. With a vast number of ordinary people carrying mobile devices that by default 
record their locations and content emission, connectivity enables immense surveillance operations, 
by both commercial and political institutions (Horne and Mali, 2014; Margetts, 2017). Location 
aware technologies and personalisation of content combine to generate big data that algorithms 
mine for re-shaping how people behave politically, spend money and come together to create social 
representations.  
 
Such massive commercial and political operations deploy a very simple system of rewards that 
reinvents operant conditioning and makes sure data keep coming.  In a scale that not even Skinner 
himself could have imagined, reinforcement by ‘likes’, ‘followers’ and ‘views’ rewards connectivity 
and makes engagement more likely to occur again. In this logic, the unit of measurement is 
‘engagement’ and the optimal result is addiction (Williams, 2018). Teenagers, despite their agency 
and fluidity in relating to social media, have been particularly vulnerable to conditioning strategies 
that capitalise on the traps and paradoxes of constant manicured self-presentation and social 
comparison in the virtual public sphere (Livingstone and Smith, 2014; Livingstone, 2008; Manago, 
2015; Manago, Guan and Greenfield, 2015; Manago, Taylor and Greenfield, 2012).    
 
Private and Public Imbalances 
Giving the self and individual control a new centrality in public life redraws the boundaries between 
the public and the private spheres and opens our private and public lives to a new range of 
challenges. The new self-centred dynamics of the networked public sphere facilitates the formation 
of in-groups and hinders other-oriented exchanges and exposure to different opinions. On the one 
hand, it can be empowering but on the other hand, it can compromise communities of shared 
attention and representation. Decreasing dialogue rigidifies societal cognition away from the plastic 
energy of identity reflexivity and cognitive polyphasia. Polemic social representations are more likely 
to occur without reference to a common ground, circulating in the public sphere bounded to their 
groups of origin and strongly attached to the identity of the in-group. A dynamic of polarisation 
between polemic representations is more likely to draw on semantic barriers to block alternative 
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representations and protect group thinking from the destabilising effect of diversity. 
Representations are more likely to resist the unfamiliar rather than trying to making it familiar. 
Anchoring relies more on stigma (Kalampalakis and Haas, 2008) and objectification on de-
humanising images and metaphors, which unregulated social media content fuel and replicate. Non-
dialogical encounters between different representations further undermine dialogue and our 
collective sense of ourselves retreats into smaller sub-groups supported by self-generated media 
content that allows selves to stay within their groups of choice. These processes of representation 
move in tandem with new technologies of selfhood in which portable private territories of meaning 
support bounded, self-contained universes of representation and opinion (Webster and Ksiazek, 
2012; Sustein, 2009). The result is polemic without common ground and selfhood without otherness. 
In public spheres, the danger is decline in communities of shared attention and shared 
representation; in private lives, we  already observe a diminished attention span and semantic 
memory, coupled with increased anxiety, depression and disregulation in body image and eating 
(Frost and Rockwood, 2017; Turkle, 2015).  
 
As much as these developments present in new shades, they are not entirely new and in many 
respects express tensions that inhere our human condition and therefore will not go away. In the 
public sphere, they take us back to Habermas’ original conception of a re-feudalisation of the public 
sphere, a tendency he spotted in the middle of the 20th century as mediated communication, 
spectacle society, celebrity culture and public relations in politics combined to undermine the 
dialogical potential of the democratic liberal public sphere. Much of what he argued then is in line 
with Arendt’s study of the Pentagon Papers, an account of American decision-making on Vietnam 
policy (Arendt, 1972). Her devastating analysis shows that image-making and lying in politics are 
neither new nor specific to the advent of the internet and social media. Post-truth is far from being a 
phenomenon unique to the twenty-first century; it is a pathology of both symbolic representation 
and group life, expressed when hyper-representation (chapter 1), that is the severance between 
representation and its object, breaks the epistemological triangle and enables representation to 
operate without referents, reference and restrain in the common space that makes human reality.  
 
In Defence of Common Ground  
When I wrote Knowledge in Context, it was clear to me that sustaining a plural public sphere is 
essential for the health of community and individuals. Yet, I was also aware that the excessive 
fragmentation of publics and representations was a real danger and a possibility that lurked in my 
argument.  My distancing from the widespread post-modern interpretations of the time was driven 
by the fear that diversification without dialogue and interdependence between Self and Alter could 
lead us into relativism and the concomitant loneliness that it entails.  
 
Today more than ever my position is that humans need a unified common centre that can 
accommodate multiple sub-publics (or individuals, depending on scale), whose boundaries and inner 
realities are important to strengthen and to defend. In-group identification and a concomitant level 
of in-group closure have always been necessary requirements of social identity and political 
empowerment, and even more so for groups and individuals socially excluded and historically 
undermined (consider Virgina Woolf’s “A Room of One’s Own”). They offer belonging and 
ontological security as well as consciousness of a social identity, which are central for the polis and 
for the self, and which unfortunately have been successively undermined in the last decades of neo-
liberal hegemony. However, in-group boundaries can be flexible and enable contact, clashes and 
dialogue with other publics and individuals.  Indeed, dialogicality between sub-publics and in-groups 
is equally relevant for building a common ground.  
 
The cohesiveness and sustainability of a plural public sphere lies in the quality of its encounters and 
its communicative capabilities as well as in its capacity to nurture and defend the reality of its sub-
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cultures. Having common experiences and sharing intentionality across sub-cultures makes for both 
a stronger common ground and stronger sub-cultures. It builds communities of thinking, practice 
and attention through which we develop as individuals and learn how to cope with the unfamiliar 
and unanticipated, however challenging these might be.  The meeting of different minds in public 
arenas can be difficult and challenging for our sense of ourselves and in-groups, but it is what 
triggers the checks and balances we all need for the health of our individual self and communities. 
Common ground enables us to deal with differences through a political sphere that establishes 
procedures about how we respond to diversity and disagreements. Psychologically, we need the 
common ground to balance and contain human emotions, and in particular to control, regulate and 
sublimate stigma, hate, aggression, resentment and revenge in intergroup relations and individual 
behaviour. These negative emotions are part of human psychology, a permanent possibility 
inscribed in our human condition and in the ways in which we relate to each other. Public spheres 
and their procedures are highly functional to regulate these emotions as we relate to each other and 
ourselves.  Human sociality and culture, with their institutions, rules and procedures contain and 
constrain our ‘dark matter’, building pathways to address historical wrongs and consolidate a 
historical sphere that connects with our individual and collective trajectories so that we can revise 
what we did and look into the future having learned from our mistakes.    
 
To retain and to protect the triadic relations that link cognition and propositional knowledge to Self 
and Alter interdependency is central to protect the fragility of our common ground and our accurate 
knowledge of the world, both hard to achieve but easy to lose outcomes of our evolved human 
cognitive and cultural capabilities. Socially and psychologically, we have evolved to build a common 
ground through reading each other’s minds, taking the perspective of other people and building 
deep bonds of attachment and love that carry us through the world with ontological security and a 
healthy sense of society and ourselves. The evolutionary foundations of our human nature are 
cooperative to the core; however, the question we need to ask is why are they constantly 
undermined by our own human ways of relating to each other and organising our societies? Why do 
we develop contexts of knowledge in which ‘dark matter’ takes us away from cooperation and 
mutual interdependency?  I doubt that any one scientific discipline will alone produce the answer to 
this question and trust the future to adjust the over-specialisation that has firmly defined the 
scientific outlook of this early 21st century.  
 
I hope that new and old readers of this book will share my confidence and optimism on the future of 
psychology as a social and cultural science connected to human goals, communities and public 
spheres. What we see and experience today may well nurture a thousand retreats from the affairs of 
the polis but psychology’s long past – if not its short history – can help, as can social psychology’s 
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